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The University of New Mexico, 1974
This is an inquest into the demise of the Cuban bourgeoisie.
How is it that, within the space of twenty-eight months, Castro's revo
lution was able to destroy this once powerful, talented and rapidly grow
ing class?
It is the thesis of this dissertation that the Cuban bourgeoisie
was destroyed not only by pressure from without, by events beyond its
control, but also that it disintegrated in considerable part from within.
To an important extent, the bourgeoisie died of its own follies, its own
failures.
This dissertation focuses on the process of internal disintegra
tion.

Separate chapters consider the impact of Castro's revolution on

the sugar mill owners, the sugar planters, the cattlemen, the indus
trialists, the banks, the public utilities, the Catholic church and the
professional organizations.

Other chapters discuss the nature of the

pre-revolutionary bourgeoisie, and their financing of Castro's rebellion.
Each chapter provides sufficient historical background to. make evident
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the strengths and vulnerabilities of the sector in question. And each
chapter is developed around one or more leading personalities of that
sector.·
The outstanding characteristic of the pre-revolutionary bour
geoisie was its ambiguity.

The Cuban bourgeoisie was torn between

Madrid and Miami, between an aristocratic and an egalitarian tradition.
It lacked widely respected leaders, and widely admired goals.

Most

members of the bourgeoisie were wrapped in an intense individualism
and devotion to their families.

They were only rarely able to c�nceive

of and support broader national interests.

Safe in their comfortable

economic and military dependence on the United States, the bourgeoisie
sought the pleasures, but not the responsibilities, of affluence.
Castro b;rilliantly exploited the weaknesses of the old bourgeoisie.
He played on their opportunism to help finance his rebellion.

Once in

power, he cultivated and won their suppo"rt, giving his revolution a
powerful initial momentum.

Thereafter he began to turn against his

benefactors, encouraging the ambitions of the less successful ranks of
the bourgeoisie for the jobs, the lands, and the honors of their upper
class confreres.

For every organization of the old bourgeoisie, a new

.

revolutionary counter-organization sprang up to contest its authority •
The bourgeoisie, betrayed by its own rebellious clerks, began to crack
along lines of age, of class ranking, of economic interest.

viii

The speed and audacity of Castro-'s revolution left the bourgeoisie
stunned; paralyzed •. A bourgeoisie accustomed to manipulating govern -:
ment by financial lures found the revolutionary government was dis
interested in money. The bourgeoisie was unnerved by Castro's sway
over the masses, and fearful of penalties that might accrue owing to their
misbehavior during the Batista era. The leaders of the bourgeoisie
vacillated, temporized, and then went' into exile. Other burgueses
remained behind, attracted by Castro's appeal to idealism, nationalism
and the heroic tradition.

In 1959 some were ready to substantially modify

their traditional dependence on the United States. And in an orgy of self
criticism, others concluded that Castro was right: Cuba could no longer
afford a bourgeoisie.
By 1960, a bourgeoisie weakened by the increasing socialization
of the economy, and demoralized by its own impotence and loss of status,
fled increasingly to Miami.

Even in exile the bourgeoisie found itself

disunited, able to agree only that the United States must save them.
When the U.S. failed to do so, they were lost.

